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Introduction (and Abstract)
The main idea of this essay stems from a grammatical peculiarity of ‘being a saint’ in the Christian context, which can be described as follows: the term ‘saint’ seems to be ascribable only to others but not to oneself. This is because claiming for oneself that one is a saint is considered morally and spiritually inappropriate, indeed self-defeating. Does this mean that sainthood is not a real property? Not all Christians are convinced that the problem with the self-ascriptions of sainthood is a general feature of the property ‘being a saint’. But, if we focus on what I call ‘the exceptionalist sense of “saint”’, there is a solid basis for accepting a rather strong grammatical asymmetry of ‘saint’ which can be found in traditional Christian understanding of humility, sainthood and human nature, respectively. In the light of this grammatical asymmetry, I have argued that the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, which rests on an influential understanding of the exceptionalist sense of ‘saint’, should be either thoroughly re-conceived or abandoned. Instead of the strong realist metaphysics, I suggested a different, Lutheran-episodic conception of sainthood which is free of this problem.

Different conceptions of sainthood

In order to appreciate the nature of the problem I have described in the introduction, it is important to get a feel for different meanings that ‘saint’ can have in Christianity and see for which of those the problem is relevant. In the first approximation and according to one popular meaning – let us call it a basic moral-spiritual meaning of ‘saint’ – ‘saint’ means a person whose moral and spiritual qualities, devotion, insight, discipline or presence, are exceptional, and who is justifiably taken as an exemplar by the community. In addition to this, in the contexts of lived folk-Christianities around the world (especially in Roman Catholicism and Eastern Churches), saints often come to be associated with the communal customs and practices surrounding the particular days or times of the year the saint became associated with, particular challenges or threats the community experiences and from which the saints have traditionally been asked for protection or help, blessings, occupations, and so on. Some saints, like St George in England or St James in Spain (where the Apostle James had become conflated with a mythologized memory of the Spanish Christian general, El Cid), have become national symbols and became associated primarily with their successes in violent combat. The connection between the actual practices of veneration of these saints on one hand and the admiration of their moral or spiritual qualities on the other can be very loose, questionable, or even non-existent.

But even if Christians are often wrong in assessing whether a particular person is or was a saint or not – indeed, even if they are wrong in discerning which moral or spiritual qualities are really the virtues worth admiring in the first place – this does not by itself delegitimize the basic moral-spiritual idea of a saint, nor does it show that there are or were no saints at all. Christians make mistakes. Furthermore, various folk-religious manifestations that are part and parcel of the cult of the saints in lived Christianity do not necessarily clash with the moral-spiritual understanding of sainthood. Taking particular saints as moral and religious exemplars can be a part of lived religion just as giving them other, less ethical kinds of symbolic significance can be. In the context of philosophical analysis, however, it is important to distinguish between the non-ethical symbolic role that the saints can have on the one hand, and the moral-spiritual conception of ‘a saint’ on the other. My focus in this essay will, therefore, disregard most aspects of the folk-religious attitudes towards the saints that belong to the so-called Christian ‘cult of the dead’ (Brown, 1981: 1), which are normally a subject of ethnography, social history, some aspects of theology, and other disciplines.

But even if we focus only on the moral-spiritual understanding of ‘saint’ in Christianity, we can find further variations. The early Christian origins of the term ‘saint’ is the New Testament Greek word hagios (based on the Hebrew kadosh) which, through the Latin translation sanctus, gave the word ‘saint’ and its equivalents to English and other European languages, respectively (see ‘Holiness (Old Testament)’). In its basic meaning, the New Testament term hagios, also translated as ‘holy’, stands for ‘different’ or ‘set apart’ by God, or for the service to God, or by virtue of the likeness with God. Two strands of meaning of hagios (when attributed to humans) that in the later centuries came to constitute two different meanings of ‘saint’ can already be noticed in the earliest sources, both of which can be described as moral-spiritual, broadly speaking. The first applies the ‘difference’, i.e. the notion of ‘being set apart’ from the rest by God, to all believers (sometimes also to all Jews and Christians). In this sense, all Christians are saints, whether they live up to the standard of how the Christians/saints should live, or not – although all are of course called to live moral lives through Christ in love. This – let us call it inclusive – sense of ‘saint’ or ‘holy’ can often be found in Paul’s letters, which usually ‘begin and end by addressing themselves to Christian communities whose members are designated as holy.’ ('Holiness (Pauline Letters)’).

The other strand of the early Christian meaning of hagios conceives saints as those who possess exceptional moral qualities. According to the authors of the Johannine corpus and the Revelation, for example, the saints are those ‘whose sterling qualities of “endurance and faith” (13:10), that is their ability to ‘keep the commandments of God’ (14:12; cf. John 8:51; 14:15, 21, 23; 15:10; 17:6; 1 John 2:3, 5; 3:22, 24; 5:3) helped them persevere’ ('Holiness (The School of St John)’). Call this the exceptionalist sense of ‘saint’. This sense of ‘saint’ is the closest to what I have described as the first approximation of the basic theological-ethical conception of ‘saint’ at the beginning of this essay. In the late Antiquity, it contributed to the so-called ‘rise of the holy man’ in Christianity, the admiration and reverence of a ‘small number’ of very special people (mostly men, rarely women), who were seen in ‘dramatic light’, as epitomes of virtuous life and far above the rest of the community in their morality, charity and religious devotion (Brown, 1971: 81; see also Gray and Corke-Webster 2020). In later centuries still, Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic traditions in particular have built upon and further developed this strand of meaning of ‘saint’. On the other hand, it was mainly in the Protestant Christianity that the inclusive sense of ‘saint’, according to which all Christian believers are simultaneously both saints and sinners, has been revived and used until this day. Roughly speaking, the problem with ‘being a saint’ explained in this essay pertains to the exceptionalist sense of ‘saint’, and not to the inclusive sense. 

Interestingly, it is the exceptionalist sense of ‘saint’ or relevantly similar concepts that have been recovered in recent philosophical and/or theological theories. In her recent work, Linda Zagzebski claims that the admiration and reverence of saints can provide the very stuff – or some of it, at least – which the explanation of moral concepts is made of. According to her theory of moral exemplarism, we should ‘begin the explanation’ of what the basic terms of moral discourse – such as ‘virtue’, ‘right’, and ‘good’ – mean ‘by referring directly to actual exemplars, identified through the experience of admiration’ (Zagzebski, 2017: 3). Zagzebski recognizes three types of moral exemplars: saints, heroes and sages. While all of these are normally taken as ‘supremely admirable persons who show us the upper reaches of human capability, and in doing so, inspire us to expect more from ourselves’ (ibid.: 1), in Christianity only the 

saint…, [understood as] ... someone who is both spiritually and morally exemplary,... comes close … [to] being exemplary in every respect. … Clearly, the hero often lacks other virtues, and I surmise that that is because courage does not require many other virtues for its exercise. In contrast, the saint is supposed to have all the virtues, and that is what we would expect if charity underlies all moral virtue, as St. Paul said (1Cor 13:1–13). (Zagzebski, 2017: 1, 96; italics added) 

Other recent theories of moral and/or spiritual exemplarism use similar concepts, but they use the same terminology somewhat differently, or apply such or similar terminologies across different religions. For example, W. George Scarlett uses the general term ‘spiritual exemplar’ in a similarly holistic way in which Zazgebski uses the term ‘saint’: spiritual exemplars are, for Scarlett, individuals who are exceptional in that they are consistently good, have a noble purpose, are successful, integrate faith and reason, respect diversity, and have a strong positive faith (Scarlett, 2012: 2). In another relatable case, Jerome Yehuda Gellman, in his contribution to the Religious Genius Project led by Alon Goshen-Gottstein, defines a ‘religious genius’ along similar lines. A religious genius is 

an integrated self where that approximates 1. A self that has an ultimate goal… as its sole long-ranging orientation. 2. A self whose ultimitism focuses and absorbs one’s life… and is not dissipated by non-ultimate distractions …, (and a self whose) 3. ...moral life ... is not Kantian or Utilitarian. It is telic, oriented towards the ultimate goal. (Gellman, 2017: 169).  

All of these definitions operate with either a sub-category of, or a category similar to, the exceptionalist sense of ‘saint’ which is largely in line with the ‘holy man’ tradition – saint as a person of very exceptional moral and spiritual qualities, devotion, insight, discipline or presence, who is justifiably taken as an exemplar by the community.​[2]​ While my own argument in this essay will be limited to the aspects of the Christian exceptionalist meaning of ‘saint’, I tend to believe some of it applies to similar concepts in other traditions and/or to the cross-religious concepts, such as Scarlett’s and Gellman’s. To argue this, however, considerably more space would be needed than this essay allows. What I wanted to show in this brief survey was simply that the exceptionalist concept of ‘saint’, or very similar or related concepts have gained currency in recent philosophical and theological-ethical theories for which the argument of this article is relevant.

So, let us return to the Christian context and define the conception of ‘saint’, which will be the focus of our discussion, a bit more precisely. According to my reading of Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory, it uses what I call a strong realist metaphysics of sainthood. As I see it, the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood is very widespread and can be found, either implicitly (as an assumption) or explicitly, in much of the Catholic as well as Orthodox Christianity and is historically related to the ‘holy man’ tradition. Strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, firstly, presupposes an exceptionalist sense of ‘saint’: a saint is someone whose moral and spiritual qualities, devotion, insight, discipline or presence, are exceptional, and who is justifiably taken as an exemplar by the community. Secondly – and perhaps too obviously to notice – it regards ‘being a saint’ as objectively real  property of a particular individual, irrespective of whether it has been discerned by anyone or not and, in case it has been discerned, irrespective of who it is that discerns, knows, expresses, or believes it. Thirdly, ‘being a saint’ is a relatively stable and (normally, ‘if all goes well’) a semi-permanent property: the individuals who have become saints in a proper and full sense of the word normally remain saints continuously and for the rest of their lives (and beyond). And fourthly and somewhat tentatively: strong realist metaphysics of sainthood normally also includes some version of the following pair of assumptions: (1) there are different degrees or levels of spirituality/closeness to God and (2) the saints are those individuals who are not only morally but also spiritually/religiously most exceptional. According to the strong realist understanding of sainthood, this is why they are justifiably taken as spiritual and not only as moral exemplars, as Zagzebski says (2017: 1). While Zagzebski does not explicitly express this fourth feature of the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, I read her account as at least fully consistent with it.

My claim is, then, that the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, described with above four elements, is problematic in the light of the self-defeating nature of the self-ascriptions of sainthood. Let us now examine the problem with the self-ascriptions of sainthood more closely. 

Fleshing out the problem

Describing oneself as morally or spiritually exceptional has been considered unchristian from the early days of Christianity. St. Clement of Rome  writes: ‘Let our praise be in God, and not of ourselves; for God hates those who commend themselves. Let testimony to our good deeds be borne by others, as it was in the case of our righteous forefathers’ (1 Cl: 30). In Christian writings of the later centuries, we find many more, as well as more sustained and detailed, reflections on what saintly humility consists in. In general terms but very influentially, St. Augustine describes humility as one’s ‘abject unworthiness before God’ (Lane Fox, 2015: 497) and presents it as ‘the all-important quality which Christians must make their own’ (ibid.: 301). St. Benedict – according to the early Benedictine tradition – introduces his ‘twelve steps of humility’ by quoting Luke 14:11 and 18:14: ‘Whoever exalts himself shall be humbled, and whoever humbles himself shall be exalted’ (Fry, 1982: 32). More to the point, however, Benedict’s seventh step of humility ‘is that a man not only admits with his tongue but is also convinced in his heart that he is inferior to all and of less value, humbling himself and saying with the Prophet: I am truly a worm, not a man, scorned by men and despised by the people’ (p. 36-37). It is only through the ‘ascending all these steps of humility’ that ‘the monk will … arrive to the perfect love of God which casts out fear’ (p. 38). In 16th Century, St. Francis de Sales, contemplating on Mary the mother of Jesus as the arch-exemplar of humility, interprets saintly humility in the following way:

[When] Our Lady … has accepted her abjection and lowliness in order to fill her with graces and favours. Nevertheless, there is a difference between humility and abjection; abjection is the poverty, vileness and littleness which exist in us, without our taking heed to them; but humility implies a real knowledge and voluntary recognition of that abjection. And the highest point of humility consists in not merely acknowledging one's abjection, but in taking pleasure therein, not from any want of breadth or courage, but to give the more glory to God's Divine Majesty, and to esteem one's neighbour more highly than one's self. (de Sales, Bk III, Ch 6) 

An exceptional humility, then, has normally been understood to be just as central to sainthood as charity (which Zagzebski takes as the defining feature of sainthood). Taking humility as centrally important for Christian life, and saints as the most humble in the community, leads us to the following critical question: what are we to make of someone describing oneself as a saint – not ironically but literally and taken in the exceptionalist sense – in the Christian context?

I suggest that the most reasonable position  should proceed from affirming a grammatical asymmetry of the term ‘saint’: it can be used in third and in second person, but not in first person. If we take this grammatical asymmetry seriously, which I suggest we should, then the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood should be either rethought considerably or rejected. The problem does not arise, I will argue, if we adopt a ‘weaker’ conception of sainthood. In the final part, I will suggest a Lutheran-episodic conception  which is consistent with the grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’. 

But is the problem with the grammatical asymmetry not a trivial one and, at any rate, one that does not pertain specially to sainthood? One might object that there is nothing special about the grammar of ‘being a saint’, since, as Wittgenstein wrote, a similar kind of asymmetry is characteristic for many descriptions of mental states (RPP II, §63) and, more importantly, for certain morally admirable properties, independently of sainthood or religious context, Christian or other. So, this problem has nothing to do with sainthood as such and should be considered in a broader grammatical context of psychological and moral self-descriptions. Take the grammar of ‘being humble’: Is it not true that ‘being humble’ is ascribable only to others and not to oneself, quite apart from any concerns with sainthood? If someone asserts, sincerely and seriously, ‘I am humble’, does this not give us a strong reason to believe that this person is less than humble? 

It might. But the claim, that the concept of humility makes all self-ascription of humility self-defeating, is too strong. What does ring true is to say that, the greater the humility, or closer to a moral perfection this humility is presented as being, the more plausible it is to say that ascribing it to oneself is morally suspect. So, while it might not be self-defeating to claim ‘I am a humble person’, to non-ironically claim ‘I am extremely and consistently humble, as well as a model of humility for others’, or ‘I am one of the most humble persons in the world’, does become self-defeating. 

So, self-ascriptions of great and exceptional moral qualities can become self-defeating, which cannot be said for self-ascriptions of those qualities per se. Crucially, what is special about the property ‘being a saint’ is that, according to a widespread understanding, saints embody a kind of an ethical and spiritual ‘extreme’, a combination of very exceptional moral qualities which makes saints stand out from the rest of the community. While humility can come in degrees, from being ‘somewhat humble’ or ‘moderately humble’, to being ‘very humble’ or even ‘exceptionally humble’, this is not the case with ‘being a saint’: it denotes an already highly exceptional and balanced combination of virtues. So, ‘being a saint’ does not come in degrees. As Zagzebski says, saint is ‘someone who is both spiritually and morally exemplary’, and 'comes close … [to] ... being exemplary in every respect’ (Zazgebski, 2017: 1). 

For this reason, it makes sense to say that, in comparison with the self-ascriptions of any single morally exceptional quality, self-ascriptions of sainthood intensify the problem of self-defeatism to a degree at which the grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’ becomes a stable rule of grammar. If we take into account that, in Christianity, ‘spiritual pride’ is one of the greatest – perhaps the greatest – sin, this becomes even clearer. In Christianity, pride has to do, not only with actions, but also with internal attitude, one’s relationship to oneself, God and other creatures in thought as well as action. Saints might not be perfect (they are not God), but, according to the strong metaphysics of sainthood, saints have incomparably less pride than most, which is to say they are much more humble than most. I will have a bit more to say about a special sub-species of pride in which Christianity is particularly interested – namely spiritual pride – below.

As a final ‘demonstration’ of the force of this problem, let us consider a relatively recent theory of a spiritual exemplarism by W. George Scarlett. It includes a description of sainthood which tries to be as objective and exact as possible. Since saints are a subcategory of spiritual exemplars for Scarlett, and since what is said of spiritual exemplars here can, given to the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, also be said about saints, we can safely use this description for our purpose: 

 [S]piritual exemplars are good. They are good in the ways they treat others (with respect, compassion, care, etc.), and they are good in the ways they dedicate their lives, often at much sacrifice to their own comfort and safety, to their causes (feeding the poor, fighting racism, etc.). Furthermore, they are good not just in the sense that they do good; they are good also in the sense that they are wise and strong in character—with wisdom and character seen most strikingly in their being both deeply connected to life‘s problems and tragedies and at the same time not consumed by problems and tragedies. … What is striking about spiritual exemplars is not simply that they have virtues but also that they show a balance between ―hard and ―soft virtues. (Scarlett 2012, 2-3).  

Supposing this is true for Christian saints, let us now imagine that a saint is asked about his own moral character. Let’s says that, trying to be truthful, exact and objective, she applies Scarlett’s description of saints to herself. Let us substitute Scarlett’s third-person description with a first-person description, so that ‘spiritual exemplar’ in the above text reads as ‘I’. Here, then, is something that a saint would have to say if and when describing herself truthfully:

I am good. I am good in the ways I treat others (with respect, compassion, care, etc.), and I am good in the ways I dedicate my life, often at much sacrifice to my own comfort and safety, to my cause (feeding the poor, fighting racism, etc.). Furthermore, I am good not just in the sense that I do good; I am good also in the sense that I am wise and strong in character—with wisdom and character seen most strikingly in my being both deeply connected to life‘s problems and tragedies and at the same time not consumed by problems and tragedies. … What is striking about me is not simply that I have virtues but also that I show a balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ virtues.

The point of this ‘demonstration’ is, of course, that a saint, especially if understood in the exceptionalist sense, would never claim something like this. We can imagine a socially somewhat inept person saying something like that, perhaps someone who is desperate for attention and respect, or a person with some kind of psychological disadvantage. It is also easy to imagine Donald Trump saying this. But not a saint. And, what holds for the above longer description applies also to any short description like ‘I am a saint’. Saints (in the exceptionalist sense of the word) do not describe themselves as saints. This does not mean that, therefore, there is no such thing as sainthood in an exceptionalist sense of the word at all and in any way. But it does mean that the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood leads to a contradiction. In other words, by using a reductio ad absurdum argument, it can be shown that, given the grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’, the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood is untenable. 

Critical responses 

Various critical responses to my argument are possible. You might think that the problem with self-ascriptions of ‘being a saint’ is not a genuine philosophical or theological problem at all, but a result of confusion or language ‘idling’, to use Wittgenstein’s terminology (PI, §132). I will now examine – and where possible, address – the most obvious objections and responses to my formulation of the problem with the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood. The first two responses, to which I am unable to develop full counter-arguments in the space of this article, are more like whole-sale rejections of what I see as a problem with the self-ascriptions of ‘saint’. The latter two responses are suggested solutions which recognize the problem in some way, but attempt to retain the strong metaphysics of sainthood despite it. My discussion in this essay, then, is primarily with those who acknowledge the problem but do not accept that the strong metaphysics of sainthood is threatened by it.

Response #1: ‘The problem is not genuine because there are no saints anyway.’

The first and perhaps the most obvious way out of the problem is, of course, to claim that nobody is a saint. Since the property ‘being a saint’ is not a real property in any way, the problem does not exist. There are some morally exceptional people, and perhaps some are exceptional in more than one way, but there is nobody that fits the high standards of sainthood – being ‘both spiritually and morally exemplary, ... in every respect’, having ‘all the virtues’ (Zagzebski, 2017: 1, 96). The concept ‘saint’ as such presupposes an unrealistic, perfectionist view of morality which is counterproductive in the actual moral endeavours of real people; or, even if ‘moral saints’ do exist, ‘moral saintliness… does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive’ (Wolf, 1982: 419). 

Such ‘eliminativist’ and rejectionist views of sainthood tend to be attractive to atheists and agnostics, of course, but also some Christians and others. I am sympathetic to some elements of the rejectionist view myself, and these elements inform the position I will explain at the final section of this essay, the Lutheran-episodic conception of sainthood. But my concern in this essay will be limited to the broadly Christian responses to the problem of the asymmetry of ‘being a saint’ - i.e. such that retain the usefulness and at least some positive meaning of the word ‘saint’. As I will argue in the final section, it is possible to affirm such usefulness without accepting the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, so the problem of grammatical asymmetry with ‘being a saint’ does not mean that all Christian concepts of sainthood presuppose an unrealistic and unhealthy moral perfectionism. 

Response #2: ‘“Being a saint” does not exhibit the grammatical asymmetry you claim it does. It is a completely ordinary property. In fact, saints can and sometimes do describe themselves as saints, and when they do it, this is not a sign of pride or of a lack of humility.’ 

There are Christians whose understandings of sainthood and humility, respectively, does not include the condition that saintly humility means the saint would never describe herself as a saint. One might, for example, think that saints might not normally say that they are saints, but at particular times or circumstances they do, and that there is nothing contradictory or inappropriate about this.

In response to this position I argue that my argument for the asymmetry of ‘being a saint’ is not based merely on logical reasoning, but builds on a notable strand in the traditional Christian understanding, not only of humility and sainthood, but also of human nature. Mainstream religious anthropology in Christianity includes a keen appreciation of the extent of our sinfulness and weakness, and the ways in which this relates to the possibilities and actualities of our linguistic behaviour. So, even if the problem with the asymmetry of ‘being a saint’ has not been fully, or often, explicated in the way I have presented it here, it is consistent with a strong feature of Christian tradition. 

But I doubt that I can easily persuade those who believe that saints can unproblematically claim that they are saints. Note that this is partly a normative question of understanding the content of the concepts of sainthood and humility, respectively, and the logical interrelatedness between them, rather than a purely empirical question that could be settled by checking whether anyone, who has been recognized as a saint in the Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox traditions, has ever described themselves as saint in the exceptionalist sense of the word. We should also keep in mind that Christians can be wrong in ascribing sainthood to those who are or were not saints – including to themselves! – as well as in not ascribing sainthood to those who are or were. So historic self-ascriptions of sainthood (in the exceptionalist sense of the word), or lack of them, by those who were or are considered saints, cannot give us a decisive, let alone final, proof for or against grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’.

The next two responses I will examine could be offered by those who tend to agree with me that saints (in the exceptionalist sense) would not claim for themselves that they are saints, but who still do not see a serious problem with the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood. 
Response #3: ‘OK, saints do not claim for themselves that they are saints. But this does not mean there is something asymmetrical or problematic with the very property of “being a saint”. It only pertains to their verbal statements. Since a saint is very humble, she will simply never say or write that she is a saint. That is all there is to it.’

My third (imaginary) respondent claims that saints never say they are saints because they are humble – but this does not mean they do not think, believe or indeed know that they are saints. So, the asymmetry of the property ‘being a saint’ is more apparent than real. It pertains only to the verbal expressions of the fact of (their own) sainthood and not to the actual property itself. 

I do not think that this solution works. The problem with such a response, at least from a Christian perspective, is that both, habitually thinking of oneself as a saint and believing that one is a saint in the exceptionalist sense is spiritually suspect in a relevantly similar way as claiming that one is a saint is. The virtue of humility does not pertain only to what one claims about oneself, and to the ways in which one says or writes it. It pertains also to one’s inner life, to the whole attitude one has towards oneself and in relation to others, the environment and God, and that includes the ways in which one thinks and what one believes about oneself. 

How could believing ‘I am a saint’ – with ‘saint’ meaning, just to remind, a person whose spiritual devotion, insight, discipline or presence, and moral qualities are exceptional, and who is justifiably taken as an exemplar – not involve spiritual pride in the same way as claiming it does? ‘The spiritually proud man thinks he is full of light already… [while a humble person] is cautious in his estimate of himself, sensitive as to how liable he is to go astray’, writes Jonathan Edwards (2005). Whether a saint verbally expresses her inner beliefs and habitual thoughts or not, their beliefs and habitual thoughts are what co-constitutes their ‘mental culture’, and that, together with the actions and our linguistic behaviour, matters quite centrally in Christian life. If it did not, humility would consist of little more than a tactic, careful guarding of what one says and what not.

Pride can have many forms. It can be disguised as humility, in which case it is, of course, a false humility. A saint does not engage in false humility: she does not say ‘I am not a saint’, or refrain from saying ‘I am a saint’, while habitually thinking and/or believing ‘I am a saint’. C.S. Lewis points to this interesting connection between not being falsely humble and not thinking about oneself as humble:

Do not imagine that if you meet a really humble man he will be what most people call ‘humble’ nowadays: he will not be a sort of greasy, smarmy person, who is always telling you that, of course, he is nobody. Probably, all you will think about him is that he seemed a cheerful, intelligent chap who took a real interest in what you said to him. If you do dislike him it will be because you feel a little envious of anyone who seems to enjoy life so easily. He will not be thinking about humility: he will not be thinking about himself at all. (Lewis, 2016: 128)

While extensive speculation about the inner life of saints is probably not the wisest way to approach this, C.S. Lewis’ suggestion that a really humble person ‘will not be thinking about himself at all’ does ring true. We can recognize that losing or ‘forgetting’ oneself in service to others should be a part of a saintly life, just as being acutely aware of one’s own sinfulness and weaknesses should. Habitually thinking or believing that oneself is a saint in the exceptionalist sense, i.e. a person of exceptional humility and goodness, when objectively compared with most human beings, cannot be a part of a saintly life.

Response #4:‘OK: Not only will a saint never claim that she is a saint; she will also not habitually think and/or believe she is a saint. But the asymmetry in the grammar of “being a saint” still need not have anything to do with the metaphysics of sainthood. It does not influence the “realness” of the property in the strong sense you describe. Why cannot strong realist metaphysics of sainthood be true even if the saints never claim, think or believe that they are saints?’


The final response I want to consider concedes the point I made against Response #3. Saints do not say or habitually think or believe that they are saints. Nevertheless, as far as the ‘unusual’ nature of the property ‘being a saint’ goes, this is all there is to it, claims the Respondent #4. There is nothing wrong with the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood: saints are still saints in a stable way and in a strong sense, independently of what anyone says, thinks or believes about sainthood, so the lives of the saints include the highest degrees of spirituality/closeness to God that are humanly possible.

But, is this position available to someone appreciative of saints? Let us assume that a certain saint has been recognized as a saint by the community already within her lifetime. Such a saint would, despite being so recognized and regarded by the relevant Christian community, nevertheless not believe that she is a saint. Doesn’t she know that she is a saint? According to most accounts of knowledge, it is not possible to know something without believing it. Is the Respondent #4 ready to give up belief as a condition of (human) knowledge? I assume not.

Perhaps Respondent #4 might want to suggest that a person who is a saint in the exceptionalist sense would know that she is considered or described as such by the community, but not that she is a saint. But this position is in a hopeless tension, if not contradiction, with other aspects of sainthood that are affirmed in the same Christian tradition, and this holds even if we remove the hypothetical fact that our saint is known to be one by the community, and retain merely the hypothesis that it is an objective fact that she is saint. Surely, if it is true that someone is a saint according to the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, that person should believe and know this. If this were not so, this would imply that NOT knowing a rather important and objective fact about oneself, namely the fact that one is a saint, would coexist with otherwise balanced combination of exceptional virtues in the same person. This would be an odd, but perhaps still logically possible position for the strong realist regarding sainthood. 

On further reflection, however, this solution is neither intellectually nor spiritually satisfying. This about it. It would mean that a certain epistemic deficiency, namely not knowing the fact that one is a saint, is an intrinsic part of sainthood – an inherent part, perhaps, of being humble in a saintly way. All kinds of funny questions arise: does not an ignorance about one’s own sainthood imply a glaring lack of self-knowledge and awareness? And, in case of the living saints, what kind of an attitude is a saint supposed to take towards those perceptive people in the community who might correctly discern what she really is: a saint? Remember that such people, probably (but not necessarily) members of the Christian community, would discern something that is objectively true, which the saint in question does not know or recognize. 

I cannot see what a satisfying answer to these questions could be. Because of this, I conclude that neither Response #3 or Response #4, both of which attempt to solve the problem while retaining a strong realist metaphysics of sainthood, succeeds. My point is that accepting the grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’ – which I suggest is reasonable and rooted in Christian tradition – should lead one to either rethink or reject the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood. This does not mean that all aspects of the exceptionalist meaning of ‘saint’ are plagued with the same problem. An alternative approach to sainthood which I find persuasive, one that remains critically affirmative of some usages of ‘saint’ and stays within a broadly Christian, if somewhat liberal, standpoint, I call a Lutheran-episodic conception of sainthood. Let’s examine its main features in the final section of this essay.

A Lutheran-episodic conception of sainthood

The Lutheran-episodic conception of sainthood which I am suggesting instead of the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood includes, first, the inclusive sense of ‘saint’ which stems from the early Christian usage, according to which all Christians are saints. It is in this sense that most Protestants affirm with Luther that every Christian is Simul Iustus et Peccator – or, in the words of Nadia Bolz-Weber, a popular progressive Lutheran preacher, that ‘we are 100% saints and 100% sinners all the time’ (‘Wednesday Night’). Grammatical asymmetry does not apply to the claims that rely on this sense of ‘saint’ because ‘saint’ in the inclusive sense does not denote a person of exceptional moral and/or spiritual virtues which would stand out from the rest.


In addition to the inclusive sense of ‘saint’, however, I suggest that Lutheran-episodic account of sainthood can include some aspects of the exceptionalist meaning of ‘saint’ as well, if we reinterpret them somewhat. In the light of the argument of this essay, the challenge we need to overcome is how not to end up in contradiction due to the grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’. Which aspects of the exceptionalist understanding of saint can pass this test? I suggest the following two: 1. Sainthood as an episodic reality of individual lives, and/or 2. ‘Saint’ as a moral idea and ideal, albeit with important qualifications which I explain below. Let us briefly examine each of these and see how they, together, constitute the alternative metaphysics of sainthood I am suggesting.


1. Episodic reality of individual lives


In contrast with the notion of sainthood as a stable property of a person, which is what the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood includes, the Lutheran-episodic understanding suggests that ‘being a saint’ is better conceived as ‘saintliness’ as pertaining to actions as well as inner attitudes: an episodic or occasional reality in the lives of (some) individuals. It is, according to this view, unrealistic to think that there is something like a stable property of ‘being a saint’ in a sense that it would hold long-term for particular individuals, say, continuously from a certain point in life and for many years after that. 

Now, people who often do exceptional, saintly acts and adopt saintly attitudes towards others, God, oneself and the environment are worthy of respect and admiration. Some humans do and adopt such acts and attitudes, respectively, far more often and with more commitment than others. They can justifiably also be regarded as role models because of their course of action, self-discipline, or alike. But the nature of human beings is such that, in the sense of sainthood according to which ‘the saint is supposed to have all the virtues’ (Zazgebski, 2017: 96), nobody is a saint in a stable, let alone permanent, way. Sinfulness at least occasionally finds ways to corrupt even the saintliest person – if not in other ways, at least through episodes of false humility and/or spiritual pride. Note how this is consistent with the grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’. If/when, after an episode of genuine saintliness which pertains to someone’s actions and inner attitude, this person starts to believe that she is a saint in an exceptionalist sense, and if this thought is not just a momentary lapse or a short episode of weakness but something she starts to habitually think and/or believe, this person ceases to be saintly, i.e. ‘a saint’ in this sense.

‘Being a saint’ is also not a property which should be linked with a high degree of spirituality or religiousness. The Lutheran-episodic approach does not conceive of spirituality as something that comes in degrees or levels, and not in a stable or even semi-permanent way. Again, the pastor Bolz-Weber expresses this eloquently: ‘no one is climbing the spiritual ladder, … but God always comes to us and makes us new, and then makes us new again, and then makes us new again…’ (‘Wednesday Night’).
One might object that the claim, that saintliness is merely an episodic reality of human lives, presupposes a very pessimistic view of human nature. This is partly true. But the view of human nature which is presupposed here needs not be seen as all gloomy and doomy: it is realistic, as it can appreciate and value the exceptional and the beautiful, but it nevertheless keeps our conceptions of humanity and of sainthood grounded and in check. The Christian view that human sinfulness is an all-pervasive reality should always inform our overall appreciation of the human situation, even while we recognize exceptional virtuousness and specialness. The view of saintliness as episodic, therefore, should not be seen as an expression of ressentiment (Zazgebski, 2017: 50-59), which is a negative attitude that occurs when moral admiration of an exceptionally virtuous person – and one far better than oneself – ‘turns into envy’ and becomes ‘a perversive rejection of the admirable, particularly, the morally admirable’ (ibid. 58). It should, instead, be seen as an expression of a theologically and otherwise informed worry that admiration and emulation of virtuous individuals, their actions, and attitudes does not become entangled with, or turn into, an idealization – or worse, idolization – of human beings, who will always remain imperfect and sinful.


2. Religious and moral idea(l)


Nevertheless, according to the Lutheran-episodic approach the concept ‘saint’ can, as an idea, play a role of a religious and moral ideal in Christian life. I say ‘can’ because the idea of a saint can also clash with a reasonable quest of an overall good life. As Frits de Lange argues, if one pursues to be a complete saint all the time, ‘one will never be able to become an Olympic swimmer, a concert pianist, or a successful scientist. If one only wants to be good, one will never be able to perfect one’s backhand or curl up with a good book solely because it gives pleasure to oneself – and to nobody else’ (de Lange, 2002: 245).

Christians should aspire to live saintly lives while at the same time practice a healthy self-love. Balancing these two aspects of a good life does not exclude a determination to act consistently in a charitable way, to allow God’s grace influence one’s life as much as possible. In this endeavour, the idea of a saint can still work as a powerful call to transcend oneself and live a more virtuous life than one does. Taking the idea of a ‘saint’ as merely a guiding ideal in this qualified way is by no means the same as naïve idealization of real human beings. It should also be distinguished from the conscious, theoretically motivated disregard of the weaknesses of spiritual exemplars, suggested by Linda Zagzebski in the context of her moral theory. To appreciate the difference between my suggestion and Zagzebski’s view, let us read a somewhat longer excerpt from Zazgebski’s essay: 
...Kevin Reimer’s L’Arche saints are weak and fallible. His emphasis on weakness in the exemplar is important for moral cultivation, but it is not very helpful for mapping the domain of positive moral concepts. Conversely, abstracting the exemplar’s most admirable qualities and acts out of a complete narrative in order to identify the qualities and acts we deem admirable requires that weaknesses be ignored. Overlooking defects in such a context is not naïve; it is just doing what theory requires, as I understand it. In my theory of theory, a theory leaves out many things relevant to moral practice and belief, and it distorts some of what is left in. ... I said that I do not think of that as a problem as long as we are aware of the distortion and what is left out reappears in other contexts. That means that our exemplars need not be 'pure’ exemplars to serve the purpose of exemplarist moral theory. There are exemplars who are admirable all things considered, but we can safely be a bit vague about what that entails. It is more common to find persons whom we admire for certain kinds of acts, and when we investigate them, we find that their admirability is limited to a certain domain or context of action. ... We might decide on further observation that what makes them admirable is limited to whatever causes a certain range of acts, and that they are not admirable in other respects. (Zazgebski, 2017: 97-98)
This line of reasoning can – and, in my view, should – be turned on its head: it is exactly because all saints are also sinners, with weaknesses as real as yours and mine, that the whole business of taking any individual, real person as the kind of moral exemplar which Zagebski reserves for saints (in the metaphysical realist sense) is questionable. Abstracting a saint who is ‘fully’ so as merely an idea(l) does not fall prey to this problem. It acknowledges that we can imagine, indeed have a powerful idea, of what a complete saint in a stable way would be. But since this is not realistic and since claiming that it is distorts reality, we should not ascribe ‘saint’ in such a strong realist sense to any particular person. The fact that everybody, even those individuals who do most saintly acts, have defects and weaknesses, should always guide our use of the term ‘saint’. Such individuals still deserve praise and special admiration, their actions are still morally praiseworthy and can offer moral guidance. But the idea of an all-round, full and stable saint should be taken as strictly no more than that: a powerful idea, sometimes an ideal, but not as a truthful description of real persons.​[3]​

It was not my intention here to offer an argument against the theory of moral exemplarism as such, but rather to develop a critical concept of sainthood which can live with the grammatical asymmetry of ‘being a saint’. My point is that treating ‘saint’ in the sense of a person that embodies ‘all the virtues’, period, as a guiding ideal instead of an attempt of a realist description of any particular person, can still have a reasonable role in Christian religious and moral life even if saintliness can be realized only episodically and is not a permanent property of an individual. This may have consequences for the theory of moral exemplarism as a whole, but to develop those would be a task for another essay.
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^1	  This essay is a result of the research for the project Creations, Humans, Robots: Creation Theology Between Humanism and Posthumanism (ARRS J6-1813), funded by Slovenian Research Agency.
^2	   Scarlett’s, Gellman’s and Zagzebski’s theories of moral and/or spiritual exemplarism have strong similarities as well as interesting differences. Perhaps most notable difference is the fact that Zazgebski’s meaning of ‘moral exemplar’ includes not only the saints, but also sages and heroes. Sages and heroes, according to Zazgebski, might be notably deficient in certain traits of their character as well as actions, but excel in just a few (or even only one) morally admirable trait or course of action. Scarlett’s use of ‘spiritual exemplar’, on the other hand, seems closer to Zazgebski’s concept ‘saint’, that is, an overall, moral and spiritual, exceptionality and admirability. The other difference is that Zagzebski rejects the use of the concept 'genius’ in morality or spirituality completely, whereas Gellman uses it quite centrally in his theory.
^3	  For the most part, this essay was completed before it was revealed in February 2020 that the founder of L’ Arche community, Jean Vanier, ‘had engaged in “manipulative sexual relationships” with women from 1970 to 2005’ (Mbengue, 2020). In a particularly sad and distressing way for many, the revelation of the ‘moral fall’ of this great spiritual exemplar of contemporary Christianity underscores, I my view, the need for a conception of sainthood that does not include the strong realist metaphysics of sainthood.
